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PRIVILEGE IN THE WORKPLACE:
THE MISSING ELEMENT IN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
Stephanie M. Wildman*
The workplace presents an example of how supposed neutrality in
language, the very words we use to describe work and the location in
which it occurs, masks systems of privilege. The invisibility of the
operation of privilege in the workplace perpetuates the systemic nature of
disadvantage. With Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, federal law
aimed at ending workplace segregation by focusing on discrimination in
employment. Antidiscrimination doctrine developed under this statute has
ignored privilege, ensuring the replication of systems of subordination.
The resulting denial of access to jobs and to promotions serves to maintain
existing economic disparity that income would alleviate and serves to
perpetuate systems of privilege.
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I. The Normalization of Privilege in the Workplace
To try to envision the invisible nature of systems of privilege in the
workplace, consider the example of women in the workplace. When we
think about women and the workplace we should imagine the whole earth,
because indeed women work everywhere. Yet somehow our definition of
work is attached to a location we call the workplace. Even the recent wave
of feminism in the 1970s encountered difficulty with the rhetoric of work,
making women who work in the home feel left out of its movement. 1 But
the idea of women's work as the domestic sphere and men's work as the
real work in the so-called public sphere has been deeply entrenched in our
language and culture. White middle-class women are entering the world
of work outside the home in increasing numbers. 2 Many women of color
and working class women have long worked outside their homes. 3 At this
historic time we need to expand the notion of work and the definition of
where it is done, promoting a vision of women at work everywhere we do
work.
When we contrast this vision of the wholeness of women's work,
permeating all aspects of life, including giving life itself, with the narrower
legal vision of workplace, the kind of place covered by federal and state
antidiscrimination laws, we can begin to see the narrowness of law's
vision. This narrowness is necessarily ours as well, we who work within
the law. But we must push on that boundary, narrowly drawn to meet our
cultural definition of work, and establish its elasticity. Keeping this larger
vision of women as workers throughout the world in mind can help us to
see what is missing from antidiscrimination law.
The very sense of the workplace has been defined, not by women, and
not in our terms. To be in the workplace is to enter a male-defined world.
Even the notion of workplace, which exists outside the home, privileges
maleness, associating work with male values and culture. The sphere
1. Mary "Rogue" Weiland, Hey, We're in This Together, CHI. TaiB., April 24, 1994, at
Womanews 11 (objecting to the distinctions made between "working" versus "stay-at-home" mothers
because although uncompensated activities are not always considered work, all of these tasks are
work); see also Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning
Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) (chronicling the joint property
rights claim of the 19th century women's movement and the struggle to define the housework of
women as "work").
2. Women make up more than 45% of the American workforce and 99% of all women will
work outside the home sometime in their lives. NEwsDAY, Oct. 15, 1994, at A33 (Business Section
Shortcuts). According to the U.S. Labor Department, there are 54 million working women in the
United States. Kara Swisher, Giving Women a Voice Workplace Survey to Check on Concerns,
WASH. Posr, May 4, 1994, at D1.
3. MARY BECKER Er AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY, CASES AND
MATERIALS 727-28 (1994).
[Vol. 4:171
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outside the home has traditionally been the situs of male work, and
therefore attached to the very definition of work. This privileging of
maleness in the workplace has not stopped simply because women now
work there as well. 4
Thus, although workplace is an apparently neutral term, descriptive
of a place of work, it is a term with a male tilt to it. The notion of
"workplace" divides the earth into loci of work and non-work, defining
only what occurs in a workplace as work. Yet this idea of workplace as
a neutral ideal permeates our cultural thinking, obscuring the male point of
view which it embodies. By imagining the workplace is neutral, many may
not see the male point of view that it privileges.
5
How women are treated and how we should behave in the workplace,
that particular location that we have designated as the locus where work
occurs, is contested and negotiated in many places outside the workplace.
6
These locations, although spatially separate, interconnect as spheres of
influence on the definition of woman. How workers relate to their
mothers, sisters, and daughters influences how they see and relate to
women at work. If at home these workers are used to having their views
privileged, then any different treatment they receive from women in the
work environment may be viewed as the women "not doing a good job."
If women are smiling and compliant in the media, then that view may be
carried over into workplace expectations. Women work everywhere, and
how we do it affects the dynamic in the workplace, as defined by Title VII.
Recently, work by space geographers, scholars examining the social
construction of place, has uncovered its gendered nature. 7  Space
4. At least some men now work in the home. But more men working in the home has not
blurred the dichotomy between private and public space. Public space is still the norm of work.
And as more women enter that public space, they still carry large burdens of work at home, work
that has been described as a "second shift." See Arlie Hochschild, The Second Shift: Employed
Women are Putting in Another Day of Work at Home, UTNE READER, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 66
(commenting upon how women's disproportionate share of household and childrearing activities
within the home, despite their employment outside the home, has lead to tensions within marriages,
a "leisure gap" between men and women, and unequal feelings of responsibility for the home).
5. Thus a tantrum at a secretary, because it occurs at a location we call "work," is work, but
the same tantrum at home is a tantrum, part of human relations, and probably unacceptable behavior.
The tantrum at work may be viewed as a professional necessity, particularly if a male executive has
one. Thanks to Trina Grillo for this example.
Furthermore, even workplace benefits continue to privilege men. "Pension laws and practices
are designed for the way men traditionally work-with no breaks in employment, building earnings,
often at a single company." Pension Gap Widening Between Women and Men, THE REcoRD, May
15, 1994, at B03.
6. Expectations of how women should behave at work are negotiated in other spaces. DAPHNE
SPAIN, GENDERED SPACES 7 (1992).
7. Id. at 38. Space geographers do not always see the interactions of the spaces that they
survey. Spain implies that the point of the legal system is to preserve social order and says the legal
system is constructed in the courthouse. Id. at 11. But of course it is not just there-it is in the
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 4 Tex. J. Women & L.  173 1995
Texas Journal of Women and the Law
geographers have found that segregated space correlates to lack of power
and knowledge on the part of the excluded group.8 Women do work
everywhere, yet the culture does not always define that labor as work.
Work performed in sex-segregated isolation, such as in the domestic
sphere, is a prime example of hard work that is neither recognized nor
compensated.
The privileging that occurs in the workplace does not stop at maleness.
Whiteness, heterosexuality, and middle class values are all privileged in the
workplace, as they are privileged in our culture. This privileging is rarely
acknowledged or recognized. Even where privileging is recognized, an
analysis of how it operates is rarely articulated. Rather, the dominant
culture proclaims that the workplace is a situs of neutral values and
judgments based on merit and on who is doing a good job. But that claim
of neutrality, often heartily believed, masks the very values that it
privileges. 9
Viewed through this lens of neutrality, workers are equivalent and
interchangeable. The United States Supreme Court canonized the notion
of interchangeable workers when it introduced the term "non-pregnant
person" into early employment discrimination litigation. The Court
declared that it was not sex discrimination to disadvantage pregnant
workers. 10 Non-pregnant persons included women and men, the Court
reasoned, implying that they were interchangeable in relation to pregnancy.
In treating them the same, the Court promoted the idea of the workplace
as neutral.
An awareness of privilege is missing from our cultural vision of the
workplace. This inability to identify and to articulate privilege is also
missing from antidiscrimination law as it is applied to the workplace.
Antidiscrimination law has missed privilege, the flip side of
disadvantaging, subordinate treatment. Eradicating such treatment cannot
end discrimination because it will regenerate from the untouched, invisible
workplace, in the definition of what is acceptable workplace behavior (and it is in many other places
as well).
8. Segregation in itself may not indicate a lack of power. The question of who controls and
defines the space is also significant. Virginia Woolf wrote many years ago of the need for a room
of one's own as a way of having space from which to create words and even power. VIRGINIA
WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OwN 4 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1981) (1929).
9. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the
Me in the LegalAcademy, 77 VA. L. REv. 539, 546-47 (1991) (discussing the difficulty of achieving
neutrality in the law and that the default viewpoint, when neutrality is claimed, is white and male).
10. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) (holding that California did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause by failing to insure pregnancy under its disability insurance
system); see also Gilbert v. General Electric, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976) (citing Geduldig 417 U.S.
at 496-97 n.20 (1974); applying Geduldig to Title VII pregnancy exclusion claims and finding no
sex discrimination).
[Vol. 4:171
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privilege that is its companion. As Adrienne D. Davis has written:
[A]nti-discrimination advocates focus only on one half of the power
system dyad, the subordinated characteristic, rather than seeing the
essential companionship between domination that accompanies
subordination, and the resultant privilege that accompanies that
discrimination .... Thus domination, subordination, and privilege are
like three heads of a hydra. Attacking the most visible heads,
domination and subordination, trying bravely to chop them up into little
pieces, will not kill the third head, privilege. Like a mythic multi-
headed hydra which will inevitably grow another head, if all are not
slain, discrimination cannot be ended by focusing only on active acts of
subordination and domination.11
The jurisprudential focus of the civil rights era has been upon
discrimination. But attacking discrimination alone cannot end
subordination, because systems of privilege regenerate the discriminatory
patterns which maintain the existing hierarchies of oppression. Title VII
law has missed the systemic nature of the discrimination it seeks to combat.
Overlooking the systemic nature of discrimination, Title VII fails to
provide a remedy for that discrimination. In naming sex, race, national
origin, color, and religion, Title VII articulates categories to be particularly
scrutinized while looking for unfair treatment in the workplace. Case law
development under Title VII has focused on discrimination based upon
these categories, but not on the power systems that operate within and
across each category to discriminate against some and to privilege
many. 12 This deficiency in Title VII doctrine, ignoring the operation of
privilege, has handicapped antidiscrimination law and doomed it to failure.
Privilege is the systemic conferral of benefit and advantage.
13
Members of a privileged group gain this status by affiliation, conscious or
not and chosen or not, to the dominant side of a power system. 14 The
11. Adrienne D. Davis, Toward a PostessentialistMethodology, or a Call to Countercategorical
Practice 35 (Sept. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Journal of Women and the
Law).
12. Noticeably absent in the list of categories for example, is sexual orientation. Recent articles
argue that the system of privilege based on sexual orientation is a form of gender oppression. See
Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIs. L. Rv. 187, 197
(1988) (reviewing the history of anti-homosexual laws and social attitudes to conclude that
contemporary negative laws and attitudes maintain gender-based norms and traditional male-female
roles); see also Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, andLegal Protection forLesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. Mu Mi L. REv. 511,617 (1992)
(arguing that homophobia serves to reinforce gender-role stereotypes).
13. Stephanie M. Wildman with Adrienne Davis, Language and Silence: Making Systems of
Privilege Visible 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 8-9, on file with the
Texas Journal of Women and the Law) (arguing that privilege is most correctly understood as a legal,
systemic advantage, not a right or individualized benefit).
14. Id. at 12.
1995]
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Title VII categories identify power systems. At a recent conference, Fran
Ansley drew a horizontal line, labeled the power line, and asked
participants to imagine where they were situated in terms of race, gender,
sexual orientation, and other categories. 15 Everyone knew what she
meant by the power line, which divided those attributes which are
privileged from those which are not. Those above the power line shared
privileged characteristics.
Affiliation with the dominant side of the power line is often defined
as merit and worthiness. Those characteristics and behaviors most shared
by those on the dominant side of the power line often delineate the societal
norm or standard.16 For example, skin color is often called "flesh-
colored," calling forth a pale-skinned image. 17 Human skin comes in
many different colors and shades, but whiteness is privileged to have the
definition of human color associated with it. Hiring someone with an
English or German accent, who is difficult to understand, may be
acceptable; the accent is associated with upper class privilege. But hiring
someone with a Filipino accent may bring the criticism that the person
cannot speak English. 18  A loud voice is privileged in public speaking,
such as in law school teaching. Yet, women are often demeaned for
having powerful voices. One law professor I know was told on her
evaluations that she would be a better teacher if she lowered her voice an
octave. Women's voices are often described as "high and squeaky,"
bearing a negative connotation. But voices cannot be too masculine. We
do not have negative words to describe a low-pitched voice, even
"booming" is complimentary. Male privileging associates positive words
with those characteristics.
The holder of privilege can opt in or out of struggles against
oppression, again often unconsciously. Even the ability to maintain one's
15. Fran Ansley, Address at the Society of American Law Teachers Conference, Diversity in
the Law School Curriculum (Sept. 23, 1994).
16. Wildman with Davis, supra note 13, at 12.
17. "Flesh-color" is defined as "the colour of the flesh (of a 'white' human being) as seen
through the skin; usually employed to denote a tint composed of "a light pink with a yello' (O'Neill
Dyeing 1862)." The Oxford English Dictionary 316 (1978). Women's hosiery colors labeled
"nude" are also a pale tone of nylon. See also bell hooks, Straightening Our Hair, Z(ZErA)
MAGAZINE, September 1988, at 33; Kim Reen, The Pain of Living the Lye, ESSENCE, June 1993,
at 38 (describing the chemical processing of hair undergone by Black women to conform to a white
standard of appearance). Thanks to Nikol G. Alexander for calling these sources to my attention.
18. See Mari J. Matsuda, "Voices of America," 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1334-40 (1991)
(describing how Manuel Fragrante was denied employment because of his accent, although he
received the highest score on a civil service exam and "his command of the English language...
exceeds that of many Americans."). My colleague Peter Kwan has commented that a British
Colonial accent, as he describes his own way of speaking English, is not associated with privilege.
The complexity of privilege, in this case accent, combined with race, gender, education, and many
other facets of being are described infra note 21 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 4:171
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silence in the face of the oppression of others is a privilege.19 One may
be silent in the face of some forms of oppression even with the belief that
she is fighting oppression when it appears in another form.
20
Heterosexual white women are often unconscious of our sexual orientation
and race privileges and the ways in which we perpetuate heterosexism and
racism even while we are fighting sexism.
21
Perhaps most importantly, privilege is not visible to the holder of the
privilege; "it is merely there, a part of the world, a way of life, simply the
way things are." 22 The presence of privilege often means a higher
comfort level in social interaction to the holder of the privilege, who need
not feel excluded when the norm describes her own actuality. One
diversity consultant I know uses this example:
Suppose you as a human are told to live in the ocean in a society of fish.
You find it difficult to breathe. When you complain that oxygen is a
problem, the fish would say this is simply the way the world is, and you
should adjust. The fish might even feel beleaguered as you gasp. "You
are getting tiresome," they say, "can't you think of anything besides
oxygen?" Water is the only world they know, even though the fish did
not create it.
23
People of color and white women must learn the workplace world of
white male supremacy, which they did not create, and master how to live
in it, even though it deprives them of the equivalent of oxygen. Well-
meaning people who function in that world as white males, like the fish,
think that their world is normal, the way things are. For the most part,
they do not mean to discriminate or disadvantage.
II. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Its Limitations
Analyzing privilege is complicated by the reality that one individual
19. Wildman with Davis, supra note 13, at 14; see also Martha Mahoney, White Working Men,
Law, and Politics: Transformation and the Social Construction of Race (1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Texas Journal of Women and the Law).
20. Id. Many who are oppressed opt to be silent about that oppression. Audre Lorde explains,
"And when we speak we are afraid that our words will not be heard nor welcomed." BELL HOOKS,
TALKNG BAcK 17 (1989) (quoting Audre Lorde). The silence of those subordinated by a form of
oppression provides emphatic reason for those who are privileged to speak.
21. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege and Liberalism in Legal Education: Teaching and
Learning in a Diverse Environment, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 88, 89 (1995) (commenting that
"[w]hite people are so eager to distance ourselves from racism and spend so much time trying to
demonstrate that we are not racist, that we fail to see the systemic privileging of whiteness.");
Stephanie M. Wildman, The Classroom Climate: Encouraging Student Involvement, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 326 (1989).
22. Wildman with Davis, supra note 13, at 15.
23. Conversation with Francie Kendall, Diversity Consultant (Albany, Cai.), in San Francisco,
Cal. (Oct. 11, 1994).
1995]
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may be privileged in one area and not another. If everyone were simply
privileged or just subordinated, then the analysis of systems of privilege
would be more obvious. But each of us lives at the juncture of privilege
in some areas and subordination in others. The image that I believe best
describes this reality is the koosh ball":
Imagine intersections in three dimensions, where multiple lines intersect.
From the center one can see in many different directions. Every
individual exists at the center of these multiple intersections, where
many strands meet, similar to a koosh ballTM. Picture hundreds of rubber
bands, tied in the center. Mentally cut the end of each band. The
wriggling, unfirm mass in your hand is a koosh ball,".24
I have described the rubbery strands of the koosh ball m as consisting of
threads of both subordination and privilege. Every individual is composed
of these aspects of identity from above and below the power line. "In
some contexts we are privileged and in some subordinated, and these
contexts interact. Societal efforts at categorization are dynamic in the same
way as the koosh ball T' is, changing, mutating, yet keeping a central
mass. "25
Thus the problem that discrimination law must address is far more
complex than is acknowledged by the act of selecting a single basis for
unfair treatment urged by statutory language. The koosh ballTM image seeks
to address the categorizing problem that intersectionality analysis in
feminist theory has identified, while adding the important dimension of
seeing privilege as well as disadvantaging treatment as part of the
analysis. 26  Re-examining Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
illustrates the limitations of the statute in acknowledging the complexity of
24. Wildman with Davis, supra note 13, at 21.
25. Id. at 22; Professor Elvia Arriola also has been working on the question of categories in
legal thought and in life. She points out the complexity of identity and the ineptitude inherent in the
legal system's efforts to reduce people to one or even two of these categories. Her work resonated
for me because of the koosh ball. We are both addressing the multi-dimensional nature of
workplace discrimination. See ElviaR. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist
Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1994).
26. Professor Arriola sees this complexity as well, urging a "holistic/irrelevancy model" to
examine discrimination. Arriola, supra note 25, at 141. She explains,
The holistic/irrelevancy model recognizes the role of unconscious attitudes and the ways
that interrelated factors create unique, compounded patterns of discrimination and affect
special social identities. In doing so, it rejects the idea of arbitrarily separating out
categories to address discrimination in our society. Instead, this model understands
discrimination as a problem that arises when multiple traits and the stereotypes
constructed around them converge in a specific harmful act. Traditional categories then
become points of departure for a deeper, more subtle analysis that explores the
historical relationships between certain social groups, as well as an individual's
experience within each of these groups.
[Vol. 4:171
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systems of privilege.
Federal antidiscrimination law has been described as "a patchwork of
statutes and one major executive order." 27 Although Title VII is only a
piece of this patchwork, it is the "centerpiece" 28 of federal employment
discrimination law, and interpretations of Title VII are often applied to
other antidiscrimination statutes.
29
Title VII forbids an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate with respect to his [sic]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or to
"limit, segregate, or classify his [sic] employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
[sic] status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."30 This language has been interpreted
to mean that intentional discrimination based on the forbidden
classifications is illegal31 and that actions having a disparate impact may
be illegal as well.32
Given the problems of our language that push toward categorization
as an intrinsic part of naming, it is unlikely that any new statute could
avoid the pitfalls of categories. And the language forbidding an employer
from limiting an employee or applicant because of any illegal classification
could be used to encompass limits imposed because of the existence of
systems of privilege. So the statutory language of Title VII could be used
to encompass a vision of a workplace that did not privilege maleness, or
any other system above the power line, even though Title VII case law has
not developed in this manner.
We have come a long way since 1964 when the Civil Rights Act was
passed and gender was added on the Senate floor as a joke, as a way to
sabotage the bill. 33 The 1970s were marked by litigation that stressed
formal equality, when women sought treatment equivalent to men's.
27. MACK A. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 12 (1992).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645 (1989) (citing the Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) court as including both overt discrimination and disparate
impact in Title VH); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, 801, 806 (1973)
(requiring more evidence of discrimination on remand after a civil rights activist was denied rehiring
after participation in a "stall in" against company).
32. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 645-46, 650-55 (requiring on remand specific
elements of hiring process that have significant disparate impacts); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (prohibiting a high school diploma prerequisite to employment since it was
unnecessary to job performance and used only as a subterfuge to prevent African Americans from
gaining employment).
33. MAcK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMNAION LAw 201 (1988).
1995]
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During that period women said, "Just give us a chance to be estate
administrators or to derive benefits from the armed service. We can do the
job as well as men can." And the doors opened a bit.34
But even the women's community quickly began debating the limits
of formal equality. The discussion about the treatment of pregnancy,
called equal/special or equal/accommodation treatment, depending on one's
view of the resolution, highlighted the interpretive nature of equality
theory. The lesson that we all see from a perspective which affects what
we perceive emerged from the pregnancy debate. And so not surprisingly,
feminist legal theorists turned to context with increased intensity. The anti-
essentialism movement of the last decade has increased our wariness
toward generalization and our fondness for particularity. Women of color
have taught us that antidiscrimination law has failed to look at the
intersections of subordination, thereby missing altogether the meaning of
the discrimination which they experience.
During these developments in feminist legal theory, Title VII doctrine
has evolved as adverse to discrimination plaintiffs' interests. In her
description of Title VII's history, Martha West explains, "Since 1981, the
Court has interpreted Title VII in ways that have created additional
obstacles for plaintiffs, not just women, but all Title VII plaintiffs." 35
West continues to explain four "restrictive and unnecessary constructions"
by courts that have undercut the possible effectiveness of Title VII as an
antidiscrimination statute. 36 These constructions include the focus on
employer discriminatory intent, the need to show that such intent was a
motivating factor in the decision, the allowance that employers may prove
the same result would have occurred absent the discrimination, and the
view that discriminatory intent is a question of fact, inhibiting possible
judicial review.37
West recognizes the existence of subconscious, unintentional
discrimination and complains that the law has not developed in ways that
are able to remedy that discrimination and its effects. 38 Describing
discrimination as "the product of widely-held, but often unarticulated
prejudices and assumptions," West acknowledges that discrimination has
34. I am a law professor as a result of these new opportunities for women. See also Stephanie
M. Wildman, Integration in the 1980s: The Dream of Diversity and the Cycle of Exclusion, 64 TUL.
L. REV. 1625 (1990) (describing the efforts and obstacles involved in trying to integrate the legal
academy by race and gender).
35. Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to Protect Women
Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 67, 95 (1994).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 95-96.
38. Id. at 97.
[Vol. 4:171
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a systemic nature.39 That systemic nature includes the usually unseen
hydra head of privilege. The recognition of systems of privilege,
complementing these systems of discrimination, would provide a full
picture of the dynamic of subordination. Privilege, operating in
conjunction with discrimination, has not been visible, accounting for the
legal system's inability to understand fully the subordination dynamic.
Title VII says it is illegal to "otherwise discriminate" or to "limit...
employees ...in any way." This statutory language is broad enough to
include an analysis of invisible systems of privilege and power, which
operate based on sex, race, national origin, color, or religion to deprive
individuals of employment opportunities. Systems of privilege and power,
by privileging those with certain characteristics or behaviors, are
discriminating against individuals who lack those characteristics and
behaviors.
A selection of one individual system of privilege and power restricts
potential litigants from describing the complexity of the privilege and
subordination dynamic. Systems of privilege and subordination interact
with each other within the workplace. An individual white lesbian may be
disadvantaged by the heterosexual workplace culture, which Title VII does
not explicitly prohibit. Yet that heterosexual culture is so connected to
definitions of maleness and femaleness that this disadvantaging may not be
separable from the privileging of maleness at work, which disadvantages
the worker on account of her sex.
The statutory language of Title VII, as it is written, helps to mask the
existence of these systems of privilege and power, as well as the interaction
of these systems with each other. Several problems are created by the
statutory language: 1) the analogy problem, which implies the fungibility
of the categories; 2) the comparison mode, by which statutory language
and case law development tilt toward comparing treatment of the
discrimination plaintiff with another individual with characteristics or
behaviors on the other side of the power line of a particular classification;
and 3) perhaps primarily, the invisibility of privilege at all in either
statutory language, case law development, or cultural consciousness.
A. The Analogy Problem in Statutory Drafting
Considering first the analogy problem in statutory drafting, Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which has served as a model
antidiscrimination statute forbidding discrimination in employment,
illustrates how the statutory drafting implicitly analogizes the discrimination
of one group to that of another. Title VII lists "race, color, religion, sex,
39. Id.
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or national origin"40 as the categories for which discrimination is
forbidden. The goal of combatting discrimination in all these areas should
be applauded. Yet the effect of this laundry list of groups, against whom
discrimination is forbidden, implies a similarity between them, as well as
shared characteristics which distinguish them from other groups not
mentioned. The absence of non-discrimination against lesbians and gay
men is a serious omission.41
The implicit emphasis on the similarities of the harm suffered from the
various types of discrimination obscures the question of how those harms
might be different. While the difference in the harms might not mean that
the law should address remedying them differently, the exploration of those
questions has not even been attempted and is implicitly discouraged.
Differences in the harms are simply ignored; the categories are viewed as
fungible. A Black man hired to lead a public interest organization was told
by a white woman, "I'm upset you got this job, when there was a qualified
woman." The woman to whom she referred was white. The woman's
comment suggests she believed it would have been the same act for the
organization to hire a Black man, a white woman, or perhaps even a
woman of color for the leadership position. But hiring a white woman
would have done nothing to combat the system of white supremacy; it
would only have combatted the system of male dominance. To imply that
these systems are the same ignores important realities of both forms of
oppression in the workplace and in the culture that sustains it.
Just as the forms of oppression and discrimination are different, the
privileging based on each statutory categorization takes place in different
ways. The differences are made harder to see because of the implicit
fungibility in the statute. In the workplace, whiteness and maleness may
both be privileged as attributes of a leader, but sexual orientation is
regarded as not visible. This perceived invisibility of sexual orientation
privileges heterosexuality. Yet heterosexuality is very visible when
workers display pictures of spouse and family. But visible displays of
40. Section 2000e-2(a) states in full:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his [sic] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his [sic] employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his [sic] status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2).
41. See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD, BREAD,
AND POETRY; SELECTED PROsE 1979-85 (1986) for an analysis of the system of sexual orientation
that permeates our culture, disadvantaging lesbians.
[Vol. 4:171
HeinOnline  -- 4 Tex. J. Women & L.  182 1995
Privilege in the Workplace
sexuality are usually only acceptable for heterosexual workers. Many gay
and lesbian workers do not feel safe displaying photos of their families in
their work environments.
B. The Comparison Mode Veils the Operation of Privilege
The comparison mode needed to prove discrimination veils the
operation of privilege. Many cases involving discrimination based on
gender, race, and other Title VII categories will never be brought because
the Title VII analysis has been based on a comparison mode. I first
described the comparison mode used in Equal Protection analysis in a 1984
article. 42 The comparison mode has been used by an individual claiming
disparate, disadvantaging treatment, "by comparing the treatment of the
individual to treatment received by those in another social group. For
example, a woman barred from the practice of law claimed that men could
practice law and, therefore, that she should be admitted to practice. "43
Similarly, in employment discrimination cases, a plaintiff claiming
discrimination based on sex must show how men were treated differently
in the workplace.44 For example, one court has said, "It is significant
to note that instances of complained of sexual conduct that prove equally
offensive to male and female workers would not support a Title VII sexual
harassment charge because both men and women were accorded like
treatment." 45 Yet offensive sexual conduct in the workplace supports a
system of subordination of women by men that contravenes the goal of
equal employment embodied in Title VII.4 6
Privileging of whiteness in the workplace can occur even when all
participants are African-American. This privileging will remain invisible
under the comparison mode. One litigator I know described a case that
settled in which the African-American female plaintiff sued for
discrimination under Title VII. Her supervisor was a white woman, but
42. Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to
Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REv. 265, 271 (1984) (explaining that the practice of
measuring equal treatment by comparing members of a discriminated group to a mainstream group
has been raised to a jurisprudential model for all Equal Protection analysis).
43. Id. (citing Myra Bradwell's famous effort to become a lawyer).
44. "In practice, this often means that a female plaintiff must come forward with comparative
evidence of a similarly situated man who secured more favorable treatment." Martha Chamallas,
Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VI: Some Contemporary Influences, 92
Mica. L. Rv. 2370, 2395 (1994).
45. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
46. The development of case law doctrine concerning hostile environmentharassment recognizes
this connection. See Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and
the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMoRY L.J. 151, 177 (1994) (describing sexual harassment as
gender subordination).
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the other co-workers in her department were also African-American
women.
The plaintiff was a large, dark, and loud woman. The supervisor was
small and demure. The plaintiff could not prove discrimination under Title
VII, which would compare her situation to others. The evidence of other
African-American women in the workplace would dispel her claim of race
discrimination. That she was the "wrong kind" of African-American
woman, because of societal preference for certain characteristics, could not
be remedied under the statutory framework without an analysis of
privilege.
The poverty of the comparison mode has been further demonstrated
by feminist critical race scholars such as Kimberle Crenshaw, 47 Paulette
Caldwell, 48 and Elvia Arriola,49 who explain that African-American
women are rendered invisible by such comparative thinking. Cases have
found that they are not Black for race discrimination purposes and not
women for sex discrimination purposes.50 Surely, Title VII's drafters did
not intend to leave out discrimination against women of color from the
reach of the statute. Yet comparisons that render women of color invisible
do have that effect.
C. The Invisibility of Privilege
Finally, the invisibility of privilege is perhaps the most pernicious part
of what is missing in antidiscrimination doctrine. Certain work is neither
defined as work nor seen as part of merit or as important in job
performance. Caring for people is a significant aspect of work that is not
privileged in the workplace.
For example, one administrator does the work of three people, but she
is not paid accordingly. She cannot demonstrate sex discrimination; there
is no similarly situated male administrator in her department. So under the
comparison mode, she has no case; and she does have a job, so there was
no discrimination in hiring. Her employer was willing to hire a woman.
The employer would say, "We are employing a woman, so how can we be
discriminating based on sex?" But much of this administrator's work is
47. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Cn.
LEGAL F. 139 (describing how Title VII doctrine renders African Americans invisible).
48. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender,
1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (discussing how various employers prohibiting braided hairstyles dqvalues
African-American women and minimizes their Title VII claim by bifurcating their race and gender).
49. Arriola, supra note 25.
50. See, e.g., Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983) described in
Crenshaw, supra note 47.
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caring for people within the institution, being sure that their needs are met
in myriad ways. This work is invisible work; it would never appear in a
job description. Meeting needs and keeping people happy are tasks women
do outside the workplace, in the home. When women arrive in the
workplace, the gendered expectation is that they will still perform that
caretaking role. Yet that caretaking role is not privileged.
One colleague once joked to me, in the era before the political Year
of the Woman, by asking me if I knew why Congress did not get more
accomplished. When I asked him why, he replied, "Because there aren't
enough women in it." This "joke" illustrates some of the cultural
complexities related to gender and workplace interaction. My colleague ig
trying to let me know that women do all the dirty work; they are the ones
who get things done. But they presumably do that job in an
uncomplaining, quiet, unseen way. He tells the story as a joke, but it is
humor that hinges on all of us understanding the unrecognized work that
women do.
The invisibility of privilege within Title VII doctrine is evidenced in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.5' In Price Waterhouse, a woman's
partnership candidacy in an accounting firm was held for reconsideration.
Later, the partners in her office refused to re-propose her candidacy and
she sued under Title VII claiming that the partnership process had
discriminated against her on the basis of sex. Although the United States
Supreme Court decision focused on the appropriate burden of proof in
cases where an employment decision resulted from a mixture of legitimate
and illegitimate motives, the case is useful for purposes of this essay for
its discussion of sex stereotyping in decision-making. 52
Plaintiff Hopkins appeared as a woman seen very differently by
different partners. In one document she was described as "'an outstanding
professional' who had a 'deft touch,' and who was of 'strong character,
independence and integrity. '" 5 3  However, her interpersonal skills
received negative comments, and she was described as "sometimes overly
aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with, and impatient with
staff." 54 Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court apparently did
not consider criticism of her interpersonal skills to be gender-related,
although it did concede that some partners reacted negatively to other
51. See 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that in a mixed nature claim under Title VII an employer
must show that its non-discriminatory reason for not promoting an employee would have alone been
a sufficient basis for the decision and exploring the effects of sex stereotyping in employment
decisions).
52. Id.; See also Chamallas, supra note 44, at 2395 (discussing the Price Waterhouse decision
as an example of structuralist theory applied to Title VII).
53. 490 U.S. at 234.
54. Id. at 235.
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aspects of Hopkins' personality because she was a woman.55 We can
only speculate as to whether a man who behaved as Hopkins did would be
described as "overly aggressive, unduly harsh, and difficult to work with,"
or whether he would be described as having rough edges in his enthusiasm
to get the job done and as someone who needed seasoning.
But even the Supreme Court could not miss the gender stereotyping
at work when one partner advised that plaintiff should "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 56 Hopkins was obviously being
criticized for not meeting a stereotyped notion of femininity. However,
one can imagine another employment situation where a woman who
dressed with make-up and jewelry, conforming to this notion of
attractiveness, could be told that she did not conform to the professional
image the company wished to use. Discrimination means women cannot
win; whatever they do is wrong because they are not men. For women,
discrimination means lose, lose.57
What is missing in the Court's analysis of sex stereotyping is that it
only sees in one direction when examining discrimination. This view
misses privilege. A system of male privilege means that men are setting
the standard to which women must conform. They are determining what
kind of woman is the "right kind." If you behave at work in one particular
way, you may be out; but if you perform in the other manner, you might
still have a problem. An analysis of privilege that goes beyond simply
stereotyping is necessary to examine the gender power system and how
decisions based on it in the workplace harm women.58
In a recent visit to Title VI, 59 the United States Supreme Court
further narrowed the legal requirements for proving discrimination. This
interpretation has taken the Court a step further in the wrong direction as
the Court is ignoring the dynamics of discrimination, concentrating on one
narrow part, and making that narrow part the whole. In the case, plaintiff
Melvin Hicks sued his employer, St. Mary's Honor Center, a halfvay
house operated by the Missouri Department of Corrections, alleging
intentional race discrimination. 60 According to the Court, Mr. Hicks had
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See generally MARILYN FRYE, THE POLIMCS OF REALIrY: ESSAYS IN FEMIINIsr THEORY
3 (1983) (describing the double bind that women are forced into due to gender roles, by using sexual
activity as a metaphor).
58. In the sex discrimination arena, the recognition of sexual harassment as a harm is about
recognizing privilege, naming the conduct of the perpetrator as negative, and thereby taking away
that privilege. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). But male privilege
remains in other forms.
59. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
60. He also alleged a violationof 42 U.S.C. § 1981, termination based on race, and a violation
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a satisfactory employment record until John Powell became his supervisor,
and Steve Long became the new Superintendent. Mr. Hicks became the
subject of "repeated, and increasingly severe, disciplinary actions. He was
suspended for five days .... He received a letter of reprimand .... He
was later demoted from shift commander to correctional officer ....
Finally he was discharged for threatening Powell during an exchange of
heated words ....
In its description of the facts of the case in the second and third
paragraph of the opinion, the Court describes Mr. Hicks as "a black
man." 62 Evidently the Court believes it is appropriate to mention race
because this case involves race discrimination. But the Supreme Court
does not mention Mr. Powell's or Mr. Long's race, which might also be
relevant if the case revolves around race discrimination. By its omission,
the Court invites the reader to assume that their race is white, making
white race the default, the norm, the privileged race.
63
In contrast, the trial court opinion, in frequent footnotes, designates
race stating that Mr. Powell is white, curiously omitting Mr. Long. 64
The Court of Appeals decision states that "Long and Powell are both
white." 65 The avoidance of white race by the United States Supreme
Court in its description of actors in the Hicks drama demonstrates the
privileging of whiteness, not only in the workplace, but in the culture in
which that workplace is being contested. But that privileging is not even
visible to the Court itself.
The Supreme Court cites with approval the District Court conclusion
that "although [respondent] had proven the existence of a crusade to
terminate him, he has not proven that the crusade was racially rather than
personally motivated." 66 This separation of the racial from the personal
is curious. The Court ignores race as a part of what a human "personally"
is. This separation of our beings from our work identity contributes to the
male tilt evidenced in the workplace. And to the extent the world is raced,
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, demotion and termination based on race. Id. at 2746. See also Hicks v. St.
Mary's Honor Center, 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (explaining that the plaintiff filed
a three count complaint against defendant and the superintendent of the facility).
61. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
62. Id.
63. See also Barbara L. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now ISee": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REy. 953 (1993) (arguing that discriminatory
intent is difficult to prove due to the unconscious assumption of whiteness); Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993) (detailing how the legal system has
promoted whiteness as a tangible property interest).
64. See Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1246 n.3 ("John Powell, Sharon Hefele, and J.R. Wilson are
white.").
65. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 970 F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir. 1992).
66. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748 (1993) (quoting Hicks, 756 F.
Supp. at 1252).
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it is hard to imagine that privileging whiteness played no part in the
workplace drama that resulted in Mr. Hicks' termination.
Margalynne Armstrong has recently described the role of economic
disparity in maintaining residential segregation. 67 The workplace is one
location where economic disparities could be changed; access to work
directly affects economic power. But the systems of privilege that she
describes in the housing sphere exist in the workplace as well. Thus far,
these systems have been insulated not only from Title VII review but also
from the vocabulary of our cultural consciousness.
The 1970s feminist slogan "The personal is political" remains true.
This slogan recognized the poverty of the private/public dichotomy that
separated spheres of work from our spheres of life. We need to remember
that the personal is part of our work and that where and how we work is
very personal. We can start by examining the privileges that we each
have.
67. See Margalynne Armstrong, Protecting Privilege: Race, Residence and Rodney King, 12
J.L. & INEQUALITY 351, 351(1994) (arguing that the legal system insulates economic discrimination
by placing it beyond the reach of civil rights law).
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